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The Public Interest in Political
Broadcasting:
Evaded, Eroded, and Eviscerated
By FRANK J. KAHN*
ERWIN G. KRASNOW**
Title III of the original Communications Act of 19341 was a
virtual reenactment of the Radio Act of 1927,2 which endowed
the radio licensing authority with a discretionary "public inter-
est" standard to guide its activities.3 Section 18 of the 1927 Act
read as follows:
If any licensee shall permit any person who is a legally quali-
fied candidate for any public office to use a broadcasting sta-
tion, he shall afford equal opportunities to all other such
candidates for that office in the use of such broadcasting sta-
tion, and the licensing authority shall make rules and regula-
tions to carry this provision into effect: Provided, That such
licensee shall have no power of censorship over the material
broadcast under the provisions of this paragraph. No obliga-
tion is hereby imposed upon any licensee to allow the use of its
station by any such candidate.'
* Associate Professor, Herbert H. Lehman College, City University of New York
and Member of the Class of 1982, Pace University School of Law.
** Senior Vice President and General Counsel of the National Association of
Broadcasters.
1. Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 416, 48 Stat. 1064 (current version at 47
U.S.C. §§ 151-609 (1976)).
2. Radio Act of 1927, Pub. L. No. 632, 44 Stat. 1162 (current version at 2 U.S.C.
§§ 361, 362 (1976)).
3. The Radio Communications Act of 1912, Pub. L. No. 264, 37 Stat. 302 (current
version at 47 U.S.C. §§ 351-63 (1976)), proved ineffective as a means of preventing signal
interference when court decisions held that it conferred no discretionary power to re-
fuse a radio license to anyone who met the Act's requirements (Hoover v. Intercity
Radio Co., 286 F. 1003 (D.C. Cir. 1923)) and no authority to issue regulations (United
States v. Zenith Radio Corp., 12 F.2d 614 (N.D. Ill. 1926)). Thus in 35 Op. Att'y Gen. 126,
132 (1926), Acting Attorney General William Donovan stated his view "that the present
legislation is inadequate to cover the art of broadcasting, which has been almost en-
tirely developed since the passage of the 1912 Act." The 1927 Act was speedily enacted.
4. Radio Act of 1927, Pub. L. No. 632, § 18, 44 Stat. 1170 (current version at 47 U.S.C.
§ 315(a) (1976)). For a timely evaluation of the original provision, see D. Ostroff, Equal
Time: Origins of Section 18 of the Radio Act, 24 JOURNAL OF BROADCASTING 367 (1980).
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With minor editorial changes,' section 18 reappeared as sec-
tion 315 of the Communications Act.
This article will demonstrate that section 315 and its recent
companion, section 312(a) (7), (1) have failed to achieve their
supposed purposes, (2) conflict with other provisions of the
Act, and (3) represent a clear example of legislation favoring
the private interests of the legislators. Therefore, these sec-
tions should be revised or repealed.
Purpose Evaded
According to the Supreme Court, "the basic purpose for
which § 315 was passed" was to achieve "full and unrestricted
discussion of political issues by legally qualified candidates."'
A former CBS president put it this way: "The original intent of
the law was simply to prevent broadcasters from giving unfair
advantage to one candidate over another."7 Neither purpose
has been achieved. For one thing, a broadcaster could com-
pletely cut off a candidate's access to his station's audience by
declining to permit any uses of the station for such purposes.'
Additionally, since it is not incumbent on the licensee to pro-
vide free time to any candidate, numerous aspirants to public
office are precluded from taking advantage of the "equal oppor-
tunities" provision because they cannot afford the time
charges that their rivals can pay. All men may be created
equal, but wealth is not among the attributes with which they
are inalienably (or even temporarily) endowed.
Section 315 has been a substantial barrier to "full and un-
restricted discussion of political issues" in several respects.
For most of its history it has served as a bar to the broadcast-
ing of joint appearances by major party candidates without fee
because broadcasters would thereby become liable to honor
5. The word "Commission" replaced "licensing authority" and "section" replaced
"paragraph."
6. Farmers Educ. and Coop. Union of America v. WDAY, Inc., 360 U.S. 525, 529
(1959).
7. F. Stanton, The Case for Political Debates on TV, NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE,
Jan. 19, 1964, at 68.
8. Admittedly, the licensee's discretion not "to allow the use of its station by any
such candidate" is seriously undercut by an FCC policy statement that includes "polit-
ical broadcasts" among the 14 "major elements usually necessary to meet the public
interest, needs and desires of the community. . . ." Report and Statement of Policy
Res Commission en banc Programming Inquiry, 44 F.C.C. 2303, 2314 (1960). Licensee
discretion to deny access to candidates for federal office was largely preempted by
enactment of section 312(a) (7) in 1972.
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requests for free time from minor party candidates whose
numbers, especially in presidential contests, could be prodig-
ious. A one-time congressional suspension of the "equal op-
portunities" provision, as it applied to presidential and vice
presidential nominees, permitted the famous "Great Debates"
between candidates Kennedy and Nixon in 1960.1 No subse-
quent suspension was enacted and no broadcast debates were
held during the three succeeding presidential campaigns.
However, in 1975, the Federal Communications Commission
(FCC) altered its interpretation of a 1959 amendment exempt-
ing "on-the-spot coverage of bona fide news events" 0 to permit
licensees to carry candidates' debates without incurring "equal
opportunities" obligations so long as such debates were ar-
ranged by someone other than the broadcasters."
Since television's arrival as the dominant mass medium, an-
other problem has arisen which prevents broadcasters from
presenting anything resembling "full and unrestricted discus-
sion of political issues" in time controlled by candidates them-
selves. It is well known that the typical political candidate
does not spend his campaign funds to finance debates or
lengthy broadcast speeches in the course of which he or she
can focus on "political issues."12 Instead, candidates opt for
the purchase of spot announcement time in which they can re-
tain the audience and get at least a snippet of a message
across. Thus are political candidates merchandised in much
the same manner as many commercial products with messages
like those that herald how this soap floats or has a pleasing
scent, how that beer is low in calories or has a fuller head, and
how this car rather than that one is economical or roomy.
"Political issues" may be alluded to in these fleeting messages,
but their primary purpose is to create a favorable image of the
9. Pub. L. No. 677, 74 Stat. 554 (1960).
10. 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (4).
11. Petitions of the Aspen Institute Program on Communications and Society and
CBS, Inc., for Revision or Clarification of Comm. Rulings under Section 315(a) (2) and
315(a) (4), 55 F.C.C.2d 697 (1975). This ruling was upheld in Chisholm v. FCC, 538 F.2d
349 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 890 (1976).
12. There are a host of reasons explaining candidates' disinclination to purchase
time in which to deliver speeches. Prime among these is the tendency of the available
audience to avoid such speeches, who prefer instead to listen to other offerings during
full-length political telecasts. When Democratic Party presidential candidate Adlai
Stevenson preempted the "I Love Lucy" program for a political address in 1952, this
message was received from a disgruntled viewer-voter: "I Love Lucy, I Like Ike, drop
dead." ERiK BARNouw, THE IMAGE EMPIRE 77 (Oxford Univ. Press, 1970).
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candidate in the minds of the electorate. 3 Thus, the amount of
serious political dialogue conveyed in the war of spot an-
nouncement trivia is abysmally low, and while it cannot be
said that section 315 caused this state of affairs, it has not been
a deterrent to it. The candidates with the most money to spend
on spot advertising have an "unfair advantage" over their op-
ponents insofar as they are able to achieve at least a greater
degree of "brand awareness." Clearly, section 315 has failed to
achieve any of the above purposes ascribed to it.
The other provision of the Communications Act that relates
to political broadcasting is section 312(a) (7), which provides:
(a) the Commission may revoke any station license or con-
struction permit ...
(7) for willful or repeated failure to allow reasonable access
to or to permit purchase of reasonable amounts of time
for the use of a broadcasting station by a legally qualified
candidate for Federal elective office on behalf of his candi-
dacy.14
This provision was added by the Campaign Communications
Reform Act, also known as Title I of the Federal Election Cam-
paign Act (FECA) of 1971.15 While the legislative history of the
section is incomplete," it was the intent of its predecessor pro-
vision,17 "to assure that those few broadcasters who happen to
favor incumbent candidates cannot continue to do so by forbid-
ding the sale of time to the opposition as well."s Other parts of
the FECA were supposed to be "an incentive to candidates to
shorten the duration of their campaigns, thereby helping to re-
duce campaign costs."" Nevertheless, when the Carter-
Mondale Presidential Committee filed a complaint with the
FCC after its October, 1979, request to purchase 30 minutes of
prime time early in December was rejected by the three major
commercial television networks, the FCC ruled in a 4-3 deci-
sion which "split along strict party lines"2 0 that the networks
13. See generally GENE WYCKOFF, THE IMAGE CANDIDATES (Macmillan, 1968).
14. 47 U.S.C. § 312(a) (7).
15. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972).
16. CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 46 Rad. Reg. 2d (P&F) 1711, 1719 n. 32 (1980), 5 MED. L. REP.
2649, 2654 n. 32 (1980).
17. S. 956, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 302(c) (1971).
18. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971: Hearings Before the Senate Subcomm.
on Communications of the Comm. on Commerce, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., 348 (1971) (state-
ment of Senators Scott and Mathias).
19. [19721 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 1781.
20. T. Smith, F. C. C., 4-3, Upholds the President in Bid for Prime Time on Television,
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had acted "unreasonably" in their rejection of the Committee's
request and therefore had violated section 312(a) (7).21 That
ruling was subsequently upheld by the District of Columbia
Circuit Court of Appeals.2 2
Thus section 312(a) (7) has been interpreted in such a way as
to favor incumbent candidates and prolong the duration of the
presidential campaign to almost a full year, contrary to the in-
tent of the section and the statute of which it is part. It is cer-
tainly debatable whether the seven political appointees who
compose the FCC are capable of stating or applying "a variety
of 'objective indicia' "23 reasonably or objectively when the
question before them concerns the broadcast access rights of
the very person in whose hands their reappointment prospects
reside.2 4
Conflict with Other Act Provisions
The provisions of sections 312(a) (7) and 315 fly in the face of
sections 153(h) and 326 of the Act. Section 153(h) provides, in
pertinent part, that "a person engaged in radio broadcasting
shall not, insofar as such person is so engaged, be deemed a
common carrier."25 Section 326 states:
Nothing in this Chapter shall be understood or construed to
give the Commission the power of censorship over the radio
communications or signals transmitted by any radio station,
and no regulation or condition shall be promulgated or fixed by
the Commission which shall interfere with the right of free
speech by means of radio communication. 26
Authoritative definitions of "common carrier" are difficult to
discover. However, the Supreme Court has said: "common
carriers are required to furnish communications service on
reasonable request and may charge only just and reasonable
N.Y. Times, Nov. 21, 1979, at A17. Four Democrats voted to honor the complaint and
three Republicans voted against.
21. Carter-Mondale Presidential Comm., Inc., against the ABC, CBS, and NBC Tel-
evision Networks, 46 Rad. Reg. 2d (P&F) 829, recon. denied, 46 Rad. Reg. 2d (P&F) 899
(1979).
22. CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 46 Rad. Reg. 2d (P&F) 1711 (1980), 5 MED. L. REP. 2649 (1980),
cert. granted, 49 U.S.L.W. 3321 (U.S. Nov. 4, 1980) (No. 80-207).
23. Id. at 1723, 5 MED. L. REP. at 2657.
24. "'The irony is that Commissioner Quello, who cast the decisive vote, is lobby-
ing the President for reappointment,' [Andrew] Schwartzman [executive director of
the Media Access Project] said." T. Smith, supra note 20, at A17.
25. 47 U.S.C. § 153(h).
26. 47 U.S.C. § 326.
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rates. . . ."2 Among the amendments to section 315 enacted in
1972 was the insertion of "under this subsection" between the
words "imposed" and "upon" in the last sentence of former
section 18 of the Radio Act of 1927, in order to permit the addi-
tion of section 312(a) (7), which imposes an obligation upon
licensees to permit the use of stations by federal candidates.
Another 1972 amendment to section 315 requires stations to of-
fer all candidates the "lowest unit charge . . . for the same
class and amount of time for the same period" during the 45
days before a primary or primary runoff election and the 60
days before a general or special election." The pre-existing
provisions of section 315 requiring broadcasters to provide
equal opportunities to political candidates and prohibiting li-
censee discretion concerning the material broadcast under sec-
tion 315 lent a common carrier cast to political uses of the
electronic media; the 1972 amendments confirmed this concept
by mandating "reasonable access to or . .. purchase of reason-
able amounts of time for the use of a broadcasting station" by
federal candidates and by stipulating the maximum fees that
licensees may charge for such uses at certain times prior to
elections.
In the Carter-Mondale case, the FCC required the networks,
and hence their affiliated stations, "to furnish communications
service on reasonable request," an element which the Supreme
Court said was a characteristic of a common carrier. Further-
more, the Act grants all candidates preferential rates on an
equal opportunities basis in their uses of stations two months
prior to general elections and 11/2 months before primaries.29
This condition provides the congressional equivalent of setting
"just and reasonable rates," which is another characteristic of
common carriers, according to the Court. This constellation of
written law and interpretation illegally converts broadcasters
into common carriers, even if the statute standing alone did
not. A more obvious violation of section 153(h) cannot be envi-
sioned.ao
27. United States v. Radio Corp. of America, 358 U.S. 334, 349 n.17 (1959).
28. 47 U.S.C. § 315(b)(1).
29. An earlier effort to set political broadcasting rates was enacted in 1952 when
subsection (b) was added to section 315. Subsection (b) read: "The charges made for
the use of any broadcasting station for any of the purposes set forth in this section
shall not exceed the charges made for comparable use of such station for other pur-
poses." This provision remains substantially the same. 47 U.S.C. § 315(b) (2).
30. An equivalent violation of section 153(h), namely imposition by the FCC of
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Section 326 is among the least sturdy of the Act's provisions.
It has been eroded by Supreme Court decisions upholding
FCC interference with broadcasters' discretion on grounds of
"scarcity"" and "intrusiveness"3 2 alike. "[Of all forms of com-
munication, it is broadcasting that has received the most lim-
ited First Amendment protection."" Still, section 326 of the
Act and the constitutional amendment from which it derives
must stand for something. The argument can be made that no
broadcaster was compelled by the Act to permit any political
candidate to use his station prior to 1972. Section 312(a) (7)
changed that situation. As recently interpreted by the FCC in
Carter-Mondale, it permits the Commission to override broad-
casters' discretion as to when to permit federal candidates to
exercise their statutorily granted access rights and to elevate
candidates' professed needs above licensees' requirements.
Once a broadcaster permits any federal candidate to use his
station under section 312(a) (7), then the licensee must meet
his section 315 obligation to grant equal opportunities to all
other candidates for that office. By substituting its discretion
for that of the licensee, the FCC "interfere [s] with the right of
free speech by means of radio communication" in violation of
section 326. This is a matter that must be finally adjudicated
by the Supreme Court.3 4
Legislation Favoring Legislators
The legislative history of section 315 and its predecessor, sec-
tion 18 of the 1927 Radio Act, shows that Congress considered
but rejected the notion that non-discriminatory access be af-
access channel requirements on cable systems, was struck down in FCC v. Midwest
Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689 (1979). There the Court reaffirmed the construction of section
153(h) with these words: "[T]he purpose of the provision [embodied in section
153(h) ] and its mandatory wording preclude Commission discretion to compel broad-
casters to act as common carriers, even with respect to a portion of their total serv-
ices." 440 U.S. at 705 n.15.
31. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969), upheld the FCC's appli-
cation of the "fairness doctrine" and rules premised thereon based on a scarcity of
spectrum space rationale.
32. FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978), upheld the FCC's determina-
tion that a daytime broadcast of a humorist's monologue was "indecent" within the
meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1464 following a nuisance channeling rationale resting on broad-
casting's "pervasive presence" (id. at 748-49) and its accessibility to children (id. at
749-50).
33. Id. at 748.
34. See note 22, supra.
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forded by licensees for the "discussion of any question affect-
ing the public. . . ."I Instead, it limited the scope of the
sections to "legally qualified candidatels] for public office," a
class that includes members of Congress seeking another term
in office.
Prior to 1952 it was common broadcast industry practice to
have three classes of rates: the lowest for local advertisers; a
higher one for national advertisers because (a) it was likely
that messages on their behalf would reach a larger audience of
potential customers for the product, and (b) the sales commis-
sion system typically returned a lower percentage of the rate to
the broadcaster than would a local time sale; finally, a third
and highest rate was established for political advertising, prob-
ably motivated in part by the realization that politicians' debts
frequently went unpaid or had to be settled for less than their
face value. When section 315(b) was enacted," broadcasters
were prohibited from maintaining this tripartite fee structure.
Thereafter, local candidates were charged the local rate and
national candidates generally paid the national rate. To some
extent broadcasters could avoid politicians' bad debts by re-
quiring payment in advance of broadcast to a greater degree
than formerly.
Then, in 1972, the FECA was enacted with a fee structure
that entitled candidates to the "lowest unit charge" made by
stations. 7 This meant that a station had to give the benefit of
its most preferential frequency discount to politicians. While
the provisions of section 315(b) (1) pertain to all legally quali-
fied candidates for public office, the grant of "reasonable ac-
cess" in section 312(a) (7)" was made applicable only to
candidates for federal elective office, the dominant class of
which is the Congress. Chairman Charles Ferris and Commis-
sioner Joseph Fogarty of the FCC, both of whom were Senate
aides at the time of the FECA's passage, have termed the law
"a selfish piece of legislation."3 9
The history of sections 312(a) (7) and 315 suggests that Con-
gress has acted more in its own interest than in the public's.
35. See generally CBS, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'1 Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 105-110 (1973)
(emphasis omitted).
36. See note 29, supra.
37. See text accompanying note 28, supra.
38. See text accompanying note 14, supra.
39. BROADCASTING, July 17, 1978, at 28.
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These sections have in effect created government of, by, and
for the government, rather than of, by, and for the people.
Some broadcasters feel that this legislation cannot effectively
be opposed by the broadcasting community; they fear that
Congress' perception of industry antagonism to sections
312(a) (7) and 315 would motivate enactment of laws that licen-
sees would find onerous. The quest for change must more ef-
fectively be initiated by nonbroadcasters who, convinced of the
legitimacy of the views expressed here, feel compelled to wage
the battle.
Conclusion
Broadcasters have amply demonstrated their ability to fulfill
their responsibility to give full and fair treatment to political
campaigns in their news coverage, discussion programs, inter-
view shows, and the like. Doubtless there are many other ar-
eas and ways in which the quality of the broadcast political
dialogue could be enhanced. But sections 312(a) (7) and 315
have outlived their usefulness, have become albatrosses
around the necks of broadcasters, and have disserved the gen-
eral public.
Urging repeal of section 315 a decade and a half ago, former
FCC Chairman Newton Minow said, "[Glive the broadcaster
the same kind of political freedom the press enjoys."40 The ad-
dition of section 312(a) (7) and the changes wrought in section
315 in 1972 have exacerbated the problem. Repeal or substan-
tial modification of these counterproductive provisions is a
pressing social need in our democracy.
40. Newton N. Minow with Lawrence Laurent, "Is There No Way Out of This Mad-
ness?," TV GUIDE, January 30, 1965, at 9. The plea for repeal was paired with a proposal
that broadcasters make available four hours of free time in the month preceding elec-
tion day to the two major political parties every presidential election year.
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